First let’s start with some­thing from Cory Doc­torow’s book Lit­tle Brother:

If you ever decide to do some­thing as stu­pid as build an auto­matic ter­ror­ism detec­tor, here’s a math les­son you need to learn first. It’s called “the para­dox of the false pos­i­tive,” and it’s a doozy.

Say you have a new dis­ease, called Super-AIDS. Only one in a mil­lion peo­ple gets Super-AIDS. You develop a test for Super-AIDS that’s 99 per­cent accu­rate. I mean, 99 per­cent of the time, it gives the cor­rect result — true if the sub­ject is infected, and false if the sub­ject is healthy. You give the test to a mil­lion people.

One in a mil­lion peo­ple have Super-AIDS. One in a hun­dred peo­ple that you test will gen­er­ate a “false pos­i­tive” — the test will say he has Super-AIDS even though he doesn’t. That’s what “99 per­cent accu­rate” means: one per­cent wrong.

What’s one per­cent of one million?

1,000,000/100 = 10,000

One in a mil­lion peo­ple has Super-AIDS. If you test a mil­lion ran­dom peo­ple, you’ll prob­a­bly only find one case of real Super-AIDS. But your test won’t iden­tify one per­son as hav­ing Super-AIDS. It will iden­tify 10,000 peo­ple as hav­ing it.

Your 99 per­cent accu­rate test will per­form with 99.99 per­cent inaccuracy.

That’s the para­dox of the false pos­i­tive. When you try to find some­thing really rare, your test’s accu­racy has to match the rar­ity of the thing you’re look­ing for. If you’re try­ing to point at a sin­gle pixel on your screen, a sharp pen­cil is a good pointer: the pencil-tip is a lot smaller (more accu­rate) than the pix­els. But a pencil-tip is no good at point­ing at a sin­gle atom in your screen. For that, you need a pointer — a test — that’s one atom wide or less at the tip.

This is the para­dox of the false pos­i­tive, and here’s how it applies to terrorism:

Ter­ror­ists are really rare. In a city of twenty mil­lion like New York, there might be one or two ter­ror­ists. Maybe ten of them at the out­side. 10/20,000,000 = 0.00005 per­cent. One twenty-thousandth of a percent.

That’s pretty rare all right. Now, say you’ve got some soft­ware that can sift through all the bank-records, or toll-pass records, or pub­lic tran­sit records, or phone-call records in the city and catch ter­ror­ists 99 per­cent of the time.

In a pool of twenty mil­lion peo­ple, a 99 per­cent accu­rate test will iden­tify two hun­dred thou­sand peo­ple as being ter­ror­ists. But only ten of them are ter­ror­ists. To catch ten bad guys, you have to haul in and inves­ti­gate two hun­dred thou­sand inno­cent people.

Guess what? Ter­ror­ism tests aren’t any­where close to 99 per­cent accu­rate. More like 60 per­cent accu­rate. Even 40 per­cent accu­rate, sometimes.

What this all meant was that the Depart­ment of Home­land Secu­rity had set itself up to fail badly. They were try­ing to spot incred­i­bly rare events — a per­son is a ter­ror­ist — with inac­cu­rate systems.

Now that all being said, DHS has actu­ally build a machine that tests for secu­rity threats.   Now if this is put into pro­duc­tion you get to be watched every­where you go and won­der about this machine judg­ing your intent and being pulled over for questioning.

If you would like to read more infor­ma­tion on this please read the link below.

‘Pre-crime’ detec­tor shows promise — Short Sharp Sci­ence — New Scientist

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